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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
IN OIL AND GAS LAW 
IN ARKANSAS
Thomas A. Daily

Rece nt  Devel op ments  in Na t ur a l  Reso ur c es Law  Circa  2005
By Thomas A. Daily1
The Midd l e Atoka  Inc r ea sed Densit y Pl an Bec o mes Cl ear  
For g et  Abo ut  Unit  Sub divisio ns
In 2002, the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission issued a couple of landmark orders 
recognizing that some Arkoma Basin gas wells are incapable of draining their 640 acre 
units. Those orders mostly involved gas fields on the south flank of the Arkoma which are 
underlain by discontinuous and thrust-busted middle Atokan sand packages. The 2002 
solution, to which this author contributed, was to divide the existing 640 acre units into "unit 
subdivisions,"2 and to permit wells in each such unit subdivision, notwithstanding that 
reservoir separation could not be established between wells in adjoining subdivisions.
The reason for that approach lay in the Arkansas statute in effect at that time.3 That 
statute defined a “Unit" as the largest area which could be efficiently and economically 
drained by a single well. The solution was imperfect. Each unit subdivision arrived with 
its own well location offset requirement. Thus, it quickly became apparent that more acres 
were off limits for drilling than were on. Moreover, since the existing wells were located 
without regard to the new grids imposed by the subdivisions, many of them tended to 
crowd the legal locations within the new subdivision boxes.
The fix was in the 2003 Arkansas Legislature. Act 276 of 2003 amended the prior 
statute to delete the reference to drainage area in the definition of unit. Rather, that statute 
now empowers the Commission to create units, to determine the appropriate number of
1Member, Daily & Woods, P.L.L.C., Fort Smith, Arkansas. 
2160 or 80 acres in area.
3A.C.A. §15-72-303.
wells within a unit and to regulate the spacing of those wells.
With that new statutory flexibility came a better solution. Forget the boxes-within- 
the-boxes. Instead, simply prescribe a minimum distance between those wells within a unit 
which produce from a common source of supply.4
Expect more gas fields, particularly on the south flank of the Arkoma, to adopt rules 
of this nature. Also expect additional reservoirs, particularly Upper Atokan, and shales, to 
be added.
Ar k a nsa s Co ur t  Disso l ves Inj unc tio n  
Res tra ining  Sur f a c e Rest o r a t ion Pen den t  Lit e
A group of surface owners sued virtually every oil company which had ever owned 
interests in the wells on their lands, alleging surface contamination. The defendants 
quickly sought to enter the land and restore the surface, including plugging wells and 
closing pits. The surface owners refused them access. The circuit judge in the case then 
issued a restraining order, enjoining the restoration "to prevent irreparable harm" (the 
destruction of evidence.) After several years mired in the litigation, and a couple of 
unsuccessful efforts to secure a modification of the injunction, the oil companies appealed 
to the Arkansas Supreme Court, which dissolved the circuit court’s restraining order.5
There is much to like about the Court’s opinion. It states that the surface owner’s 
real entitlement is to have his land restored, not to receive a verdict in a lawsuit. Surface 
restoration is the strong public policy of the state of Arkansas. Even if the restraining order 
was justified at the beginning, the Plaintiffs had plenty of time to find and preserve their
4That distance has been set at 560 feet in Waveland, Booneville, Chismville and 
Mansfield Fields and 750 feet in Gragg Field.
5AJ& K Operating Company v. Smith, 355 Ark. 510, 140 S.W.3d 475 (2003).
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evidence.
Ar k a nsa s Sup r eme Co ur t  Ho l ds Pr esumpti o n That  Indemnif ic a t io n
Agreem ent  does no t  Appl y t o  Act s or  Omissio ns of  Ind emnif ied  Pa r t y 
is Ina ppl ic a bl e t o  Sur f a c e Rest o r a t io n Lia bil it y
There is a completely logical presumption that is used in the judicial construction of 
an indemnification agreement. Unless the agreement provides so explicitly, a party 
presumed to not be indemnified from his ow n acts o r omissions.  However, in a March 
2004 decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that presumption to be inapplicable to 
the indemnified party’s duty to conduct well site surface restoration.6
Chevron sold producing properties to Murphy, which then sold them to Merit Energy. 
Both of those contracts required the buyers to indemnify the sellers against all claims 
relating to the wells which were asserted after the sale date. The surface owners sued 
Merit and others, including Chevron, alleging surface contamination. Chevron then sued 
Murphy for a declaratory judgement that Murphy was required to indemnify Chevron. 
Murphy defended that the indemnification agreement did not expressly state in clear and 
unequivocal terms that Murphy was to indemnify Chevron for liability that Chevron may 
have caused to the tract. The circuit court ruled for Murphy, relying upon the presumption 
against an agreement indemnifying a party against his own fault.
The Supreme Court reversed. It held that since the duty to restore surface is 
implied by law as a duty of the current working interest owner,7 it is logical to assume that 
it was considered and assumed by the purchaser of the lease. The appellate court also
6Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Murphy Exploration and Production Company,___ Ark.
___, ___ S.W .3d____, (2005).
7Bonds v. Sanchez-O’Brien Oil & Gas Co., 289 Ark. 582, 715 S.W.2d 444 (1986).
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gave Murphy indemnification from Merit.
The court’s ruling is pragmatic. There is a strong public policy favoring restoration 
of well sites. The current operator is there, on-site, presumably reaping benefits from the 
well. Placing the primary liability on the current operator is thus more likely to result in the 
restoration taking place.
Ar k a nsas Supreme  Court  Applies  Acc ret ion  
Ow ner sh ip Rul es to  Lea seho l d Working  Inte re st
Swaim v. Stephens Production Company8 is an accretion case involving a stretch 
of the Arkansas River which has emerged as dry land. Pursuant to statute,9 the state quit- 
claimed the emerged lands to the appurtenant riparian owners, including Swaim.
The State’s riverbed lease called for a 1/8 royalty. Swaim’s lease had been 
amended to increase his royalty to 3/16. The question presented was one which all parties 
acknowledged had never been answered in a reported decision: which of those leases 
applies to the emerged land. Clearly the only question presented was one of law. Both 
parties moved for summary judgment. The Circuit Court agreed with the lessee, 
Stephens, that the state lease, with its 1/8 royalty, continued to apply to the former 
riverbed. The Supreme Court reversed, granting summary judgment, and an extra 1/16 
royalty, to Swaim.
The dilemma presented to working interest owners is that under the court’s ruling, 
ownership of existing wells can change with accretion, even to the extent of putting an 
owner in the well, who was formerly a working interest owner or unleased mineral owner
8___A rk .___ , ___ S.W .3d___ (2004).
9A.C.A. §22-5-404.
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in an adjoining unit.
In defense of the opinion there is no perfect way to deal with accretions. This is just 
another example of that. Luckily the Corps of Engineers has pretty much stabilized the 
Arkansas River, so this kind of case is not likely to often reoccur.
Your  Humbl e Aut ho r  is Al a r med by Loo se 
La ng ua g e in Otherwise  Munda ne Case
Rigsby v. Rigsby10 is, for the most part, a very ordinary estoppel case. It involved 
a father, Harold Rigsby, and his Son, Brett Rigsby. Brett convinced the circuit court that 
he had relied to his detriment upon Harold’s promise to give him a one-half interest (in 
partnership) in Harold’s farm for working there and contributing to payment of the mortgage 
debt. The circuit court included a one-half interest in the oil and gas under the property in 
computing Brett’s share.
Harold had argued that there was no evidence of estoppel with regard to the mineral 
interest. Moreover, he advanced a rather unique “severance” theory. He contended that 
the combination of his earlier oil and gas lease of the land to Hogback Exploration 
Company, and the payment of substantial royalties by Hogback to Harold had “severed” 
the mineral interest from the surface and, thus, Brett did not acquire any mineral interest 
by virtue of the estoppel.
Sadly, the four members of the court who joined in the majority opinion did not reject 
that "severance" theory. Rather, the majority ruled that the trial court had not ruled upon 
the theory and it thus was not properly presented for appeal. Even more remarkable, and
10___A rk .___ , ___ S.W .3d____(2004).
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pretty disturbing, is the fact that the three dissenting justices11 would have ruled that the 
lease and payment of royalties effected a “severance” of the minerals.
Does that mean that these justices would rule that some other conveyance of lands
which are subject to a royalty-paying lease and which fails to mention minerals conveys
only surface? This author hopes not, but is a little concerned.
Fif t h Circu it  Hold s  t hat  Rea so na bl e Po s t -Pr od uct io n  
Co st s a r e Propor tio na tel y  Deduc t ible  Fr o m Roy alty  
In Texa s, Even When Con t ra c t  is wit h an Af fi l ia t e
In 1997, an operator, MC Panhandle, entered into a gas sales agreement with 
MidCon Gas Services, a subsidiary of MC Panhandle. Both were then subsidiaries of 
Occidental. Shortly thereafter, Occidental reorganized those companies so that, while they 
remained affiliated entities, MidCon was no longer a subsidiary of MC Panhandle. 
Effective March 3,1998, Chesapeake purchased MC Panhandle. Chesapeake did not buy 
MidCon.
In April 1998, MidCon began deducting gathering and transportation fees, pursuant 
to a provision in the 1977 contract (which apparently was not enforced when the seller was 
its parent company.) Chesapeake passed a proportionate share of those fees through to 
the royalty owners who sued, contending that the deductions breached their leases. The 
District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted summary judgment for the royalty 
owners. It ruled that, because the gas sales agreement was originally entered into by 
affiliates, which, at the time, had identical management and ownership, it was a sham 
transaction, as a matter of law.
11Justice Corbin wrote the dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Brown 
and Thornton.
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The Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit reversed.12 The mere fact that contracting 
parties are affiliates does not establish that the contract a sham. Rather, the contract’s 
terms should be compared to terms in similar agreements between arm’s-length parties 
to determine whether it is a reasonable agreement.
Thr ee Recent  Repor t ed Cases Appl y Da u b e r t  Test  
to  “Exper t ” Test imo ny in Oil  a nd Gas Ca ses
in his excellent article prepared for the 2001 Arkansas Natural Resources Law 
Institute,13 E. R. Norwood provided us with an excellent discussion of the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Daubert and Kumho Tire Co., Ltd v. Patrick 
Carmichael et al.14 That case requires the trial court to serve as a gatekeeper for 
determining the admissibility of expert testimony in civil cases by determining whether the 
testimony is relevant and has a reliable basis in the witness’s knowledge and experience 
in the relevant discipline. Three 2004 cases, from Oklahoma, Texas and Louisiana, make 
it clear that state courts will apply the Daubert test to alleged oil and gas experts.
Oklah oma  Appea l s Cour t  Rul es tha t  the  Right  t o  
Infl at io n-Adjust  Over hea d Rat es is Lost  if  not  Exe rcised -
Per mits  an “Experi enc ed Opera to r ” to  Testify  as 
Expert  on Indus tr y  Cust om Under  Da uber t  St a nda r d
Oneok Resources Company was the operator of several unit wells pursuant to an 
AAPL JOA and attached COPAS. The COPAS permits the monthly per-well overhead 
rate to be increased, annually in April, based upon increases in a government index tied
12Ramming v. Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America,___ F.3d____(5th Cir.
2004).
13Exper t  Test imon y  - Geolo gy  and Reser vo ir  Eng in eer in g : At  Tr ia l  and 
Administ r a t ive Hea rings .
14526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167. 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999).
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to earnings of oil and gas field production workers. However, Oneok and its predecessor 
operator did not increase these overhead rates for several years. When Oneok realized 
this it sought to increase the rates to a level which would be attained if all previous 
increases had occurred. The non-operators sued, contending that Oneok could only 
increase the overhead rates in comparison the those rates in effect immediately prior to 
the increase.
The trial court permitted the non-operators to call a witness named Agee. Agee had 
a Ph.D. in economics but was not a member of COPAS, nor was he an accountant or 
auditor. Rather, he was an operator of wells and the founder of XAE Corporation. He 
testified that industry custom followed the non-operators’ interpretation of the admittedly 
ambiguous COPAS provision.
On appeal Oneok challenge the trial court’s refusal to sustain a Daubert challenge 
to Agee’s expert witness qualifications. Applying what it said was the Daubert standard, 
the Appeals Court held that Agee was entitled to express his opinions upon industry 
customs and practices,15
Texas Supre me Co ur t , Appl ying  Da uber t , Rev er ses Ver dic t  
Because Petroleum  Eng ineer  Wit ness wa s Perm itt ed  t o  Expr ess 
Co nc l usion as to  Dr a ina ge Damages With ou t  Adeq ua te  Fo unda t io n
In an "implied covenant to prevent drainage”16 case the royalty owner plaintiffs were 
allowed to present the testimony of a petroleum engineer named Michael Riley. Riley 
constructed an economic model which assumed, without any scientific foundation that a
15Stephenson v. Oneok Resources Company, 2004 Ok. Civ. App. 8 1 ,___P.3d
, (2004).
l6Kerr-McGee Corporation, et. al. v. Helton, 133 S.W.3d 245 (Tex. 2004)
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hypothetical well, "timely" drilled upon the Plaintiffs’ tract would have produced at exactly 
the same rates as the alleged draining wells during the time period in question. The Texas 
Supreme Court reversed a substantial jury verdict for the Plaintiffs by disallowing Riley’s 
testimony as failing to meet the Daubert17 standard. The court agreed that engineering 
testimony can be used to create a model of the reservoir and predict the performance of 
a hypothetical well. Indeed, that is what petroleum engineers do . However, that is not 
what Riley did in this case. He merely assumed, without scientific basis, some hypothetical 
production volumes which he then multiplied by dollars to reach a damage opinion 
supportive of the Plaintiffs.
Loui sia na  Court  of  Appeal  Appl ies Da ube rt - Al l o ws “Indus try
Exper t ” t o  Test ify  as t o  Damages f o r  Fai lur e  t o  Rel ea se Lease
A third jurisdiction to apply Daubert18 in an oil and gas case was Louisiana. 
Chesapeake Operating Inc. v. Richardson19 was a case in which the lessee, Chesapeake, 
failed to timely exercise its option to extend the primary term of Richardson’s lease and 
then refused to release the lease. Instead, Chesapeake sued for a declaratory judgment 
that it should be forgiven its untimely exercise of the renewal option because it was the 
result of “good faith mistake", "inadvertence and oversight.” The facts were proven by 
Richardson to be otherwise. Richardson proved that Chesapeake failed to renew his lease 
because it was waiting and watching development in the area, before deciding what leases
17Supra.
18Supra.
19 ___S o .__ , ___ (2004).
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to renew.
Chesapeake successfully challenged Richardson’s expert witness, Guy Ellison, an 
“expert in oil and gas leasing in the Austin Chalk trend,” on the basis of Daubert. On 
appeal the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal reversed. That court held that Ellison 
should have been allowed to testify that there was demand for leases in the vicinity on the 
day that the primary lease term expired, and that subsequent unsuccessful drilling 
operations caused that demand to evaporate before Chesapeake actually released 
Richardson’s lease. The appeal court rejected Chesapeake’s contention that Richardson 
was required to prove that he missed an actual, specific opportunity to lease.
Okl ah oma  Sup r eme Co ur t  Disting uishes  Bet ween The o r ies of  
Impl ied Covena nt  to  Ma r k et  a nd Cessa t io n of  Pro duc t io n in Pa ying
Qua nt it ies-L esso r ’s Demand no t  Req uire d  in t he  Lat t er  Type of  Ca se
In Smith v. Marshall Oil Corporation20 Smith, the former operator sought to quiet title 
to certain wells which he had operated as well as equipment left on site. Marshall had 
obtained new leases from Smith’s Lessor. Smith contended that Marshall and the lessor 
were barred from suing for cancellation of the leases since there had never been demand 
made for Smith to comply with the implied covenant to market oil or gas from the wells. 
However, the court was unimpressed with Smith’s argument, holding, instead, that the 
wells had failed to produce in paying quantities and, thus, no demand was required.
Marshall contended that the wells were incapable of producing in paying quantities 
until Marshall took over and reworked the wells. Smith claimed otherwise but the trial court 
held, as a matter of fact, for Marshall on that issue. It was undisputed that the revenue 
from the wells was far less than operating expenses. However, Oklahoma law does permit
2084 P.3d 830 (Ok. 2004).
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a lease to continue, although production is at a loss, for “equitable considerations.” The 
Supreme Court found Smith to be devoid of those. Indeed, the court termed Smith’s 
admitted behavior: “I produced them when I felt like producing them. And I turned them 
off when I felt like turning them o ff’, “conduct...unacceptable for an operator in the state of 
Oklahoma.”
Texas Cou rt  of  Appea l s Enf o r c es Mai nt ena nc e of  Unif or m Inte re st  
Cl ause-H o l ds Wel l  Pr o po sa l  by Farm -ou te e Inva l id and Hold s  Fa r m-o ut o r
Liabl e f o r  No n -Co ns ent  Pena l t y
For years, industry professionals in the Arkoma Basin have given and gotten 
borehole farm-out agreements, notwithstanding that such agreements are in direct violation 
of the “Maintanance of Uniform Interest” provision of most JOA’s. We have heard various 
theories why that was not a problem. One of those was that the clause was not specifically 
enforceable and thus, other parties to the JOA would have to prove damage from its 
violation. That is precisely what happened in a recent Texas Appeals Court case, Exxon 
Mobil Corporation v. Valence Operating Company,21 In that case Texas’ First District Court 
of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s award of damages equal to the non-consent penalties 
which Valence suffered when it ignored well proposals made by Exxon Mobil’s farm-outee.
It seems a little disingenuous to conclude that the Farm-outee's well proposals were 
invalid and, at the same time to charge anyone with the non-consent penalties resulting 
from those invalid proposals, but that is what appears to have happened. Also, can we just 
assume that the wells drilled under the illegal farm-outs will ever be good enough to 
recover those penalties? The case does not appear to be well reasoned at ail, regardless
21___P.3d____(Tex. App. 2004).
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of how you feel about Maintenance of Uniform interest.
This marks the second recent case out of a major oil and gas producing jurisdiction 
honoring the Maintenance of Uniform Interest provision22 and, if upheld, invites a pretty 
frightening method for enforcing the clause with damages. Exxon Mobil has petitioned for 
rehearing. Ultimately, the case may well go to the Texas Supreme Court. We will continue 
to watch it. Stay tuned.
It ’s Ano t her  one of  Them Odd Yea r s, Zee k ,
The Legislature ’s on t he  Loose
In Arkansas, “odd” years are made a bit odder by the biannual phenomenon known 
as the “Regular Session of the General Assembly.” Picture citizen legislators from the hills 
and swamps descending upon the state capital, each with a mission: to fix, by hook or 
crook, every perceived injustice done recently to any of their constituents and, in the 
process, advance the combined agendas of the NRA, MADD and last Sunday’s fire and 
brimstone sermon at Third Reformed Antioch Pentecostal Free Will. It usually is a pretty 
scary sight, and 2005 will be no exception, although the follies have just begun.
Here are the texts of bills introduced or under consideration for introduction as of 
February 15. These have been ranked according to the standard system as Good, Maybe 
Good, Bad and Absolutely Awful. Things change instantly in the Legislature. Therefore, 
our oral presentation may or may not vaguely resemble these bills. Nevertheless, here 
goes:
22The other being Pitco v. Chaparral, 2003 Ok. 5, 63 P.3d 531 (2003).
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GOOD
Stricken language would be deleted from and underlined language would be added to the law as it existed
prior to this session of the General Assembly.
1 State of Arkansas
2 85th General Assembly A Bill
3 Regular Session, 2005 HOUSE BILL 1224
4
5 By: Representative Maloch
6 By: Senators Horn, G. Jeffress
7
8
9 For An Act To Be Entitled
10 AN ACT TO AMEND § 15-72-102 TO DEFINE OPERATOR;
11 TO AMEND § 15-72-303 TO ALLOW AN OPERATOR TO
12 APPLY FOR AN ORDER TO INTEGRATE THE INTERESTS OF
13 OWNERS IN A DRILLING UNIT; AND FOR OTHER
14 PURPOSES.
15
16 Subtitle
17 AN ACT TO DEFINE OPERATOR AND TO ALLOW
18 AN OPERATOR TO APPLY FOR AN ORDER TO
19 INTEGRATE THE INTERESTS OF OWNERS IN A
20 DRILLING UNIT.
21 
22
23 BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS:
24
25 SECTION 1. Arkansas Code § 15-72-102 is amended to read as follows:
26 15-72-102. Definitions.
27 As used In this act, unless the context otherwise requires:
28 (1) "Commission" means the Oil and Gas Commission as created by
29 this act;
30 (2) "Person" means any natural person, corporation, association,
31 partnership, receiver, trustee, guardian, executor, administrator, fiduciary,
32 federal agency, or representative of any kind;
33 (3) "Oil" means crude petroleum oil, and other hydrocarbons,
34 regardless of gravity, which are produced at the well in liquid form by
35 ordinary production methods and which are not the result of condensation of
36 gas after it leaves the reservoir;
01-24-2005 10:16 GLG006
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